VIII Международная студенческая научная конференция Студенческий научный форум - 2016

Contents

1. Battle……………………………………………………………………..3

2. Communication between defeat and not assistance to the risen Warsaw..8

3. Literature……………………………………………………...…………13

Fight at Warsaw of 1944 (other names — fight near Radzimin, tank battle in a predpolya of Warsaw, fight near Volomin, battle near Okunev) — counter tank battle to the east from Warsaw at the end of July — the beginning of August, 1944. Tactical defeat of the Soviet troops in this battle led to a suspension of approach to Warsaw and finally to defeat of the Warsaw revolt.

1. Battle

The Lublin-Brest operation called into question reality of plans of Model for deduction of the front along Vistula. The field marshal could parry threat by means of reserves. On July 24 the 9th army was recreated, forces arriving to Vistula were subordinated to it. However, first the structure of army was the extremely poor. At the end of July the 2nd tank army started testing it for durability. Radziyevsky's army had an ultimate goal occupation of the base for Narev (inflow of Vistula) to the North from Warsaw, around Serotsk. On the road the army had to take Prague, suburb of Warsaw on east coast of Vistula.

After mastering the area Brest and Sedlets the right wing of the front to develop approach in the general direction to Warsaw with a task not later than August 5 — 8 to seize Prague and to seize the base on the west bank of river Narev in the area Pultusk, Serotsk.

By the time of an exit to vicinities of Warsaw Red Army, having passed about 500 kilometers since June 23, I stretched the orders and communications. Transports with ammunition, regimentals, the food and fuels and lubricants lagged behind. Besides troops of the front temporarily lost air cover as the 16th air army given them didn't manage to transfer the base on the airfields, nearest to the front, yet. Germans, in return, having pulled together 5 tank divisions to Warsaw, (including divisions CC), turned into counterattack and forced on July 31 the Soviet command to pass to defense. On August 1 fresh German parts counterattacked the 2nd Guards tank army which strongly escaped forward and coming nearer to the suburb of Warsaw: To the Warsaw Prague, also forced it to depart.

In the evening on July 26 the motorcycle vanguard of army faced the German 73rd infantry division at Garvolin, the city on east coast of Vistula to the northeast from Magnushev. It became a prelude of difficult maneuverable battle. The 3rd and 8th aimed at Prague Guards tank cases of the 2nd tank army. the 16th tank case remained near Demblin (between Magnushevsky and Pulavsky bases), expecting until it is replaced by infantry .

The 73rd infantry division was supported by separate parts of the "landing and tank" division "Hermann Goering" (a prospecting battalion and part of artillery of a division) and other separate parts of infantry. All these troops were united under the leadership of the commander of the 73rd Fritz Franek in Franek group. On July 27 the 3rd shopping mall broke "Hermann Goering's" reconnaissance baht, the 8th гв. the shopping mall also achieved break. Under the threat of coverage the Franek group was rolled away to the North. At this time to the aid of the beaten infantry division tank parts — the main forces of the Hermann Goering division, 4 and the 19th tank started arriving. divisions, the Viking divisions CC and "The dead head" (in two cases: the 39th tank Dietrich von Sauken and the 4th tank case CC under supervision of Gille). In total this group consisted of 51 thousand people at 600 tanks and SAU. The 2nd RKKA tank army had only 32 thousand soldiers and 425 tanks and SAU (the Soviet tank case approximately corresponded on the number of the German division). Besides, fast advance of the 2nd THAT led to lag of backs: fuel and ammunition were brought with interruptions.

However still main forces of the German tank association didn't arrive, the infantry of Wehrmacht had to take out heavy blow of the 2nd THAT. On July 28 and 29 difficult fights, Radziyevsky's cases proceeded (including suited the 16th tank) tried to intercept the highway Warsaw-Sedlets, but couldn't punch "Hermann Goering's" defense. Blows to infantry of Franek group were much more successful: near Otwock the weak place in its defense was groped, group started covering with the West therefore the 73rd division started receding unorganized under blows . The general Franek was captured no later than July 30 (the 30th dates Radziyevsky's official report about his capture) . The Franek group was broken into separate parts, suffered heavy losses and was quickly rolled away to the north.

The 2nd tank army conducted approach on the right river bank Vistula in the general direction to the north after unsuccessful attempt on July 25 to break on the west bank of Vistula straight off on the railway bridge at Demblin . She acted at weak cover of the right flank with the 6th cavalry division, and the 3rd tank case which escaped forward remained in general without any infantry or cavalry cover. By August 3 it got to a bag and suffered heavy losses .

The 3rd tank case was aimed deeply at the northwest for the purpose of coverage of Prague, through Volomin. It was risky maneuver, and in the next days it nearly led to accident. The case broke through a narrow gap between the German forces, in the conditions of accumulation of enemy fighting groups on flanks. the 3rd shopping mall suddenly underwent flank attack at Radzymin. On August 1 Radziyevsky orders to army to pass to defense, but the 3rd shopping mall from break doesn't take away .

On August 1 parts of Wehrmacht cut the 3rd shopping mall, having beaten off Radzymin and Volomin. Ways of withdrawal of the 3rd shopping mall were intercepted in two places . According to some information, in fights for Volomin and Radzymin, in cooperation from 3 shopping malls the local divisions of Army Craiova from division "Bird of paradise" which suffered also losses worked (13 soldiers of AK) were killed in battle in Volomin.

However collapse of the surrounded case didn't take place. On August 2 the 8th гв. the tank case in blow from the outside broke a narrow corridor towards to surrounded . Was to rejoice to rescue surrounded so far early. Radzimin and Volomin were left, and the 8th гв. tank and the 3rd tank cases had to defend from the tank divisions of the opponent attacking from several parties. On the night of August 4 in an arrangement of the 8th гв. shopping malls send the last large groups of okruzhenets. In 3 shopping malls in a copper two commanders of crews were lost . By August 4 to a place of battle there arrived the Soviet infantry in the person of the 125th shooting case and a cavalry. Two fresh connections were enough for a full stop of the opponent on August 4. It should be noted that forces of the 47th and 2nd tank armies carried out search of the soldiers of the surrounded 3rd shopping mall who remained behind a front line, rescue of several honeycombs okruzhenets became result of these actions. On the same day the 19th tank division and "Hermann Goering" after unsuccessful attacks on Okunev were removed from under Warsaw and started being thrown to the Magnushevsky base, aiming at it to destroy. Ineffectual attacks of Germans on Okunev proceeded (forces 4 тд) and on August 5 then forces of the attacking ran low.

Heavy losses were suffered by the 8th Guards tank case, considerable — the 16th tank case. On August 5 — 6 the 2nd tank army which lost by then 284 tanks (according to the German data — 337), was withdrawn from action and sent for replenishment and rearrangement. On August 2 were compelled to stop approach and to pass to defense the 69th and 8th Guards armies, having got under the German counterstroke from the area Garvolin. Battle proceeded till August 10 . As a result the German counterstroke was stopped, predmostny strengthenings in areas Magnushev and Pulava remained in RKKA hands, but the 1st Belarusian front on this site remained without mobile connections and was deprived of possibility of maneuverable approach. Germans undertook on these sites a number of the hardened counterattacks with the purpose to beat out from here Russians; and though the last managed to hold the seized bases in the hands, they had no enough forces to expand them.

German (more widely, western) the historiography estimates fight at Radzimin as serious success of Wehrmacht to measures of 1944. It is approved about destruction or, at least, defeat of the 3rd tank case . However information on the valid losses of the 2nd tank army forces to doubt justice of the last statement. From July 20 to August 8 the army lost 1433 persons the killed, missing and prisoners. From this number 799 people fall on counterstroke near Volomin. At the actual numerical structure of cases on 8 — 10 thousand soldiers, such losses don't allow to speak about death or defeat of the 3rd shopping mall in a copper even if all them would be incurred by it one. It is necessary to recognize that the directive on occupation of the base for Narev wasn't executed. However the directive was issued at the moment when Germans of large group near Warsaw had no data on existence. Existence of mass of tank divisions near Warsaw in itself did impossible having dug to Prague, and furthermore, for the river, rather small 2nd tank army. On the other hand, counterstroke of strong group of Germans at their superiority in strength brought modest results. Losses of the German party can't be definitely found out as for a ten-day period on July 21 — 31 the 9th army of Wehrmacht didn't provide reports on the suffered losses . For the following ten-day period the army reported about loss of 2155 people by the dead and missing persons.

After counterstroke near Radzimin, the 3rd shopping mall was taken away to Minsk-Mazovetsky for rest and replenishment, and the 16th and 8th гв. tank cases were thrown on the Magnushevsky base. The same divisions, "Hermann Goering" and the 19th tank, as near Radzimin became their opponents there.

2. Communication between defeat and not assistance to the risen Warsaw.

So far there are two points of view on the reasons for which the Soviet offensive actions near Warsaw were stopped. According to the point of view of the emigrant Polish government, Stalin's desire that strengths of joint stock company in Warsaw were crushed by Germans was the main cause of it that unambiguously would resolve an issue of the power in Poland in favor of the pro-Soviet Lublin committee.

According to the reports prepared by the chief of operational management of the General Staff of Red army lieutenant general Shtemenko, the 28th army of the 1st Belarusian front for August, 1944 conducted offensive combats, by August 15 having reached Yaduva, Dzezhanuva, Vuyuvka (52 — 60 km to the northeast of Warsaw) and having come across strongly strengthened opponent's positions, after several unsuccessful attempts to break through them stopped and reflects counterattacks of the opponent, being engaged in strengthening of the reached boundaries.

As the historian Boris Sokolov believes, finally the destiny of revolt was decided by Stalin on August 9 when Mikolaychik rejected his offer to create the government together with Lublin committee.

According to the second point of view which was official in the USSR, but shared and the western historians , approach of the Soviet troops was slowed down for purely military reasons. The communications which are dragged out owing to fast advance didn't allow to adjust supply of armies of the 1st Belarusian front and to bring necessary reinforcements. In turn, reduction of communications of Wehrmacht allowed Germans to throw efficient tank and shooting connections which inflicted over the Soviet troops serious defeat in the area Radzymin — Volomin — Okunev from the West and the northeast, having surrounded and having practically destroyed the 3rd tank case of Vedeneyev. The red army was exposed to continuous counterstrokes and with big losses could leave to Warsaw only to the middle of September. By this time the centers of revolt were localized, and bridges through Vistula — are blown up.

The commander of the 1st Belarusian front Rokossovsky points to a bolt from the blue of revolt and inconsistency of actions of its management with command of Red army, noting that capture and deduction of Warsaw was possible only at the beginning of revolt at direct approach of troops of Red army to the city.

Curt Tippelskirkh notes that at the time of the beginning of revolt "force of the Russian blow already ran low and Russians refused intention to seize the Polish capital from the course". However he considers that if at once after the beginning of revolt Russian "continued to attack predmostny strengthening, position of the German troops in the city would become hopeless"; only the termination of the Soviet attacks allowed Germans to concentrate forces necessary for revolt suppression. In August, Tippelskirkh notes, RKKA moved the activity to the south from Warsaw — to bases at Pulav and Cooking for which expansion it conducted fights, long, but rather unsuccessful for it. He explains this small progress as persistence of the German troops, and "with that circumstance that Russians concentrated the main efforts on other sectors of the front".

Norman Davies believes that the Soviet group standing against Warsaw was weakened because reserves were thrown on the Romanian and Balkan front. However, according to David Glantsu, the 2nd Ukrainian front received reinforcements from the 1st Belarusian front in the form of the mechanized Pliyev's case only by the beginning of Debretsensky operation — by October 6 — that is in 4 days after revolt defeat. Other fronts involved in Romania and on the Balkans didn't receive anything and, on the contrary, were compelled to transfer the connections to the 2nd Ukrainian front. Replenishment of troops by people was carried out at the expense of recruits from the freed territories of Ukraine and Moldova.

Liddel Garth considers that in fights near Warsaw (as well as near Insterburg) the Soviet troops for the first time for all operation "Bagration" suffered "serious failure". As the reasons of such course of events it considers: a) the "natural" law of a strategic overstrain — the German communications were reduced, Russians, on the contrary, were too stretched; b) the Soviet offensive actions took the form of "direct actions" — the opponent, earlier never knowing authentically where the main blow will be struck (which could move from one point on another during the operation), in cases with Warsaw and Insterburg could tell absolutely surely that will be the purpose of approach.

Today it is established that the order on transition to defense of the 2nd tank army which broke on the Prague direction was given to the acting commander of army on August 1 at 4:10 Moscow time, that is approximately in 12 hours prior to revolt and in one and a half days before it became known of revolt in London, and through London in Moscow.

Jan Novak-Ezioransky reports that after the beginning of revolt the Soviet tank armies ceased to receive fuel. However already on July 31 — one days prior to revolt — Rokossovsky reported that his troops already experienced difficulties because of shortage of fuel which was caused by "the constant separation of troops from bases of supply because of lag of restoration of the railroads".

On August 8 G. K. Zhukov and K. K. Rokossovsky offered Stalin the following plan of action: after a necessary pause in some days for rest, pulling up of backs and a regrouping, from August 10 to August 20 to perform a number of preparatory operations (the right wing — an exit to river Narev with occupation of the base near Pultusk, the left wing — expansion of the Sandomirsky base on Vistula), and, after a new respite in 5 days, since August 25 to begin large-scale operation on liberation of Warsaw.

Boris Sokolov and E. Durachinsky consider that this report had no consequences: it wasn't followed by the relevant orders, and the Warsaw operation wasn't carried out in practice.

Sokolov claims that in the middle of August all five German tank divisions which put counterstroke on RKKA near Warsaw were removed from the Warsaw front and sent to the north to cut through a corridor and to reestablish overland communication between groups of Sever and Centre armies. Sokolov believes that this operation lost meaning in case of the Soviet approach to Warsaw as the weakened German forces couldn't constrain it and furthermore to keep in the north the front from Latvia to Oder. However troops of the 1st Belarusian front on Vistula didn't move a little while the German 3rd tank army made the way to the Baltic Sea at Tukums who was taken by Germans on August 20.

However, contrary to B. Sokolov's opinion, to Kurland only the 39th tank case was thrown. the 4th tank case CC where the Dead Head and Viking divisions entered, remained near Warsaw.

According to Curt Tippelskirkh, in the middle of August the 1st Belarusian front began approach to the north of Warsaw, to Entre Rios of Bug and Vistula, and to the 18th rejected the 9th and 2nd armies of Wehrmacht for Bug. On August 22 the offensive was taken also by the 2nd Belarusian front. As a result by August 31 the Soviet troops hammered some deep wedges into orders of the German troops, but the conceived break didn't come out [8]. On September 3 approach was resumed: Germans were rejected for Narev and organized some bases near Pultusk, as well as it was supposed in the report. By September 16 approach exhausted, and the front was stabilized in the area of the Vistula River , thus for Germans there was Modlin.

To the south of Warsaw persistent fights round the Soviet bases around Pulava and at the Pilica River in the area Cooking proceeded. Bases RKKA were expanded, but break of the German orders wasn't successful.

The 47th army stopped near the Warsaw Prague and which stretched the orders on 80 km till August 20 remained in this area all alone. On August 20 the 1st Polish army of the general Berlinga connected to it.

At the beginning of September the Soviet front investigation found some German parts participating in battle with the 2nd tank army to the north of Warsaw — near northern bases on Vistula . First of all it was talked of the tank Viking division, shortly before it thrown to Modlin's region for rest and replenishment, but compelled to engage with the coming parts of PKKA. The obtained data allowed to make the decision on blow near the Warsaw Prague that was done in common by the 47th army and the 1st Polish army on September 10. On September 14 Germans cleared Prague, having transported the remains of the troops on other coast and having blown up bridges. Attempt of the Soviet troops to land prospecting connections across the river straight off, on shoulders of the receding opponent, wasn't successful [23].

Literature

1. Litas.: Bivor E. Falling of Berlin. 1945. M, 2004

2. Józef Urbanowicz [red.]: Mała encyklopedia wojskowa. Tom 2. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1970, s. 778

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