VIII Международная студенческая научная конференция Студенческий научный форум - 2016

The Siege of Sevastopol also known as the Defence of Sevastopol took place on the Eastern Front of the Second World War. The campaign was fought by the Axis powers of Germany, Romania, and Italy against the Soviet Union for control of Sevastopol, a port in the Crimea on the Black Sea. On 22 June 1941 the Axis invaded the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa. Axis land forces reached the Crimea in the autumn of 1941 and overran most of the area. The only objective not in Axis hands was Sevastopol. Several attempts were made to secure the city in October and November 1941. A major attack was planned for late November, but heavy rains delayed the Axis attack until 17 December 1941. Under the command of Erich von Manstein, Axis forces were unable to capture Sevastopol during this first operation. Soviet forces launched an amphibious landing on the Crimean peninsula at Kerch in December 1941 to relieve the siege and force the Axis to divert forces to defend their gains. The operation saved Sevastopol for the time being, but the bridgehead in the eastern Crimea was eliminated in May 1942.

After the failure of their first assault on Sevastopol, the Axis opted to conduct siege warfare until the middle of 1942, at which point they attacked the encircled Soviet forces by land, sea, and air. On 2 June 1942, the Axis began this operation, codenamed Störfang (Sturgeon Catch). The Soviet Red Army and Black Sea Fleet held out for weeks under intense Axis bombardment. The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) played a vital part in the siege. The Luftwaffe made up for a shortage of Axis artillery, providing highly effective aerial bombardment in support of the ground forces. Finally, on 4 July 1942, the remaining Soviet forces surrendered and the Axis seized the port. Both sides had suffered considerable losses during the siege and attack.

With the Soviet forces neutralised, the Axis refocused their attention on the major summer campaign of that year, Operation Blue and their advance to the Caucasus oil fields.

Battle.

Air offensive.

Von Manstein demanded an all-out assault by the Luftwaffe before the main ground action began. Situated only 70 km from Sevastopol, the German formations had barely enough time to reach altitude before reaching their targets. Fliegerkorps VIII began its bombing campaign along the north and southeast of the city. At the same time, German medium bombers conducted rolling attacks on the city, which included all units except LG 1, which engaged in suppressing anti-aircraft installations. Von Richthofen watched the bombing from an observation post close to the front. The targets were badly damaged, and fires broke out all over the port city. The Luftwaffe flew 723 missions and dropped 525 tons of high explosive on the first day. Despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, just one Ju 87 was lost.

While the bulk of the Luftwaffe was busy with the land battle, III/KG 26 sought to break Soviet sea communications. They sank the tanker Mikhail Gromov, but the flotilla leader Tashkent, the destroyer Bezuprechnyy, and transport Abkhaziya escaped to bring 2,785 soldiers into the fortress. Air support continued with 643 sorties on 3 June 585 on 4 June, and 555 on 5 June, with some German crews flying daily averages of 18 missions. By the start of the ground attack on 7 June, the Luftwaffe had flown 3,069 sorties and 2,264 tons of high explosive and 23,800 incendiary bombs were dropped. Many of the bombs dropped were 1,000 kg SC 1000, 1,400 kg SC 1400, and 2,500 kg SC 2500 bombs. The heavy-caliber weapons were aimed at Soviet concrete bunkers. Ivan Laskin, commanding the 172nd Rifle Division in the northern sector recalled, "Bombers in groups of twenty to thirty attacked us without caring for their targets. They came in, wave after wave, and literally ploughed up the earth throughout our defence area". From 3 to 6 June, the Luftwaffe carried out 2,355 operations.

On 7 June, von Manstein ordered the ground assault. The Luftwaffe carried out 1,368 sorties and dropped 1,300 tons of bombs on Soviet positions, but the Soviet infantry clung on.

Ground fighting: 7–10 June.

Satellite image of the Sevastopol area. Note the dense forest terrain situated on high ground and valleys to the east of the port.

LIV Corps was to strike the main blow. Situated on the northeast edge of the city, they struck along the lines of least resistance, across the Belbek river while the German XXX and Romanian Mountain Corps conducted holding attacks in the south and center, respectively. Both the latter corps did not start major operations until 8 June.

The artillery bombardment targeted bunkers with 105 mm fire, which usually received 10–25 rounds. German 36 and 37 mm guns also did an effective job of eliminating machinegun nests. The Germans were also quick to bring up 88 mm artillery guns to fire directly into bunker apertures. Between 2 and 6 June, the German 11th Army expended nine percent of its munitions (42,595 rounds, amounting to 2,449 tons of munitions) on pre-advance shelling. The railway guns also fired a few rounds at the main fortifications and rail lines, but most missed by some distance. The closest shell landed 80 meters away from its target. Soviet ammunition dumps were also targeted by these weapons, with no effect. The main fortifications, forts Stalin, Molotov, and Maxim Gorky (which lay in the path of LIV Corps) remained active. It was not until the afternoon of 6 June when one shell from 'Thor' knocked out Maxim Gorky's second turret, damaging the weapon. This was the only success of the German super-heavy guns, which did not have an impact commensurate with their expense. The Luftwaffe had a greater impact, using its Ju 87s to knock out the communications systems of the fort.

On the morning of 7 June 1942, the German infantry began advancing cautiously. XXX Corps attacked the southern positions held by the 7th Naval Brigade and 388th Rifle Division. The German infantry advanced behind air and artillery support. The infantry seemed afraid of their fire support and did not advance close enough behind it. The bombardment also failed to have enough of an effect. The Soviets held their fire until the Germans were well within range before opening fire, and little progress was made. Von Richthofen was angered by the fear of the infantry and called the day "a real disappointment". The next few days were not much better, despite the Luftwaffe flying 1,200 sorties. The pace of operations exhausted the machines and men. Often crews did not get out of their aircraft and made three or four sorties without rest.

LIV Corps began its assault in the north on the seam of the Soviet defence sectors III and IV. The 'Schwerer Gustav' weapon continued to fire against ammunition dumps, which produced no effect. Nevertheless, the 132nd Infantry Division was able to work its way up to the river. The 600 mm guns concentrated on the coastal batteries and Maxim Gorky fortress. Meanwhile, the German 22nd Infantry Division attacked further to the east. Some 200 Soviet reinforcements of the 79th Naval Infantry Brigade, protecting this sector, were lost in the bombardment, but the main defences held out. The brigade held most of its forces in reserve, while committing only a single company to cover the hilly terrain on the Belbek river front. German assault groups breached the first and reserve lines by 08:15. The Germans had to negotiate heavily mined areas, slowing them down and allowing the Soviets to make a partial recovery. Supporting operations by the 50th and 24th German Infantry Divisions failed, which cost the Germans 12 StuG assault guns. The remote-control demolition units were not effective as the terrain was unsuitable.

By 17:15 the town of Belbek was secured. The 22nd Infantry Division made considerable progress in breaking through the defenses of the 25th Rifle Division. The 50th Infantry Division supported the 22nd's left flank. Now facing the Germans was the Haccius Ridge, on which the fortress Maxim Gorky was located. It was flanked by several smaller forts to the east.

A burning Soviet position.

Now the 132nd Infantry Divisions was ordered to conduct a converging pincer movement on the Maxim Gorky fortress in conjunction with the 22nd and 50th Infantry Divisions, to trap its defenders against the coast. The 132nd pushed into the 95th Rifle Division's positions north of the fort, while the other two divisions attacked in a flanking move. While the Germans did make progress, nearing the main railway station just southeast of Maxim Gorky, they were stopped from achieving a full-scale breakthrough by the 172nd Rifle Division. The 22nd and 50th Infantry Divisions had been heavily shelled by mortar fire from the 25th Rifle Division facing them east of the Haccius Ridge, which caused heavy casualties. By 18:00 hours, the German attack was spent.

LIV Corps' losses on 7 June amounted to 2,357 casualties in four divisions, including 340 killed. It had also expended 3,939 tons of ammunition. The 132nd Division had exhausted all of its basic munitions load by midday. On the other side, the formidable Soviet defence lines east and southeast of Belbek had been overrun, and the Germans succeeded in advancing 2 km through dense Soviet defences. The Soviet casualties had also been severe. It is estimated that three battalions were effectively destroyed.

Von Manstein recognised the seriousness of the failure on 8 June. He was worried that the 132nd Infantry Division, locked in combat with the 79th Naval Brigade and 95th and 172nd Rifle Divisions north of the city on the Belbek river front, was "approaching the end of its strength". Once again, the army turned to the Luftwaffe for support. Richthofen responded by ordering attacks against Soviet supply lines. The same day, German bombers, including KG 100, began attacks on Soviet shipping. They sank the destroyer Sovershennyy and the survey vessel Gyuys, with the 4,727 ton transport Abkhaziya and destroyer Svobodnyy following them on 10 June.

The period between 8–12 June descended into a battle of attrition. Several Soviet counterattacks were repulsed with heavy losses. The German LIV Corps extended the salient on the seam of the III and IV sector to 3 km, determined to break through before Petrov could reinforce his lines. The 132nd Infantry Division cleared the Haccius Ridge while the 22nd Infantry Division overran most of the Soviet 79th Naval Infantry Brigade. The Soviet unit tried counterattacking on 10 June, but was repulsed. The Soviet formation was effectively destroyed, with the support of the Luftwaffe, which used anti-personnel bombs against Soviet infantry caught in the open. Only one battalion was in a position to block the Germans from encircling the Maxim Gorky fort. Still, on 8 June LIV Corps had lost 1,700 men. In return, the lodgement in Soviet lines was extended to 3 km deep and 5 km wide.

In the south, XXX Corps made no progress in four days of attacks. They suffered 496 casualties at the hands of the 109th Rifle Division. The 28th Light and 72nd Infantry Divisions had succeeded in puncturing the Soviet lines opposite the 109th and 388th Rifle Divisions. The outer defences were broken in some parts, but the most were still in Soviet hands on 12 June. The main belt on the Sapun Ridge (Sapun-gora) was unbroken. Soviet casualties amounted to 2,500, including 700 captured. By 13 June, XXX Corps had lost 2,659 men, including 394 killed.

Air-land operations: 11–15 June.

As the Germans made slow progress toward the main train station, Petrov withdrew the battered 172nd Rifle Division and replaced it with 345th Rifle Division. The 95th Rifle Division halted the 132nd Division's progress in the north. Although a relatively quiet day, 10 June saw the elimination of the Soviet 79th Naval Brigade and LIV Corps lost 2,772 men. Counterattacks by the Soviet 345th Division aimed at the hinge between the German 132nd and 50th Divisions were repulsed by the Luftwaffe. On 11–12 June, LIV Corps lost another 1,957 men. The Soviets had committed all of their reserves and were stretched dangerously thin. One more push might collapse the northern sector. But at this time, the tired German infantry were running short on reinforcements and ammunition.

In contrast, the Black Sea Fleet was bringing in reinforcements in spite of the Luftwaffe. On 12 June the cruiser Molotov and destroyer Bditel'nyy brought in 2,314 soldiers, 190 tons of ammunition and 28 artillery pieces. The Luftwaffe turned its attentions to these convoys. On 13 June it sank the transports Gruzyia, TSch-27, patrol boat SKA-092, motor boat SP-40, five barges and a floating crane. On 15 June another 3,400 soldiers, 442 tons of ammunition, 30 tons of fuel and 12 tons of provisions reinforced the Soviets.

The Luftwaffe had flown 1,044 sorties on 11 June, dropping 954 tons of bombs. The consumption rate of ammunition was putting von Richthofen's logistical network under strain and he could no longer afford to fly massed bombing raids. On 11 June, he surmised there was less than two days worth of munitions left, requiring a change of tactics. Instead of carpet bombing, fewer targets would be attacked simultaneously, and aircraft would strike at designated targets in long and narrow lines. This was designed to maintain accurate pressure without wasting ordnance. Even this failed to alleviate shortages in the long term. By 17 June, scarcity of aviation fuel meant the Luftwaffe dropped only 800 instead of the planned 1,000 tons of bombs. Adding to the Luftwaffe's troubles in the sector, von Richthofen was transferred to prepare the Corps' Headquarters near Kursk support the nearing Operation Blue. He retained formal command, at least until given control of Luftflotte 4, but Wolfgang von Wild took over air operations over Sevastopol.

The primary objective for the 22nd Infantry Division on 13 June was Fort Stalin, blocking the advance to Severnaya Bay. It was a tough position. The fortifications allowed the Soviets to concentrate artillery against breakthroughs and machine gun posts protected the fort from southern and eastern attacks, but it was vulnerable from a northern assault. In addition, only 200 men from the 345th Rifle Division were stationed there. The Germans launched their assault on the position at 03:00 on 13 June with just 813 men. The 3rd Battalion was assigned to suppress Soviet machine gun and mortar positions located on the southeast as a diversion. The 1st Battalion, supported by five StuG assault guns, two 37mm guns and an Engineer Company were to serve as the main effort. Some 200 and 110 men were committed respectively in each unit.

German bombardment began on 12 June. Artillery fire from 'Dora' had failed to neutralise the fort. At 19:00 the 22nds divisional artillery began shelling the fort and its smaller supporting fortress, Volga, located to Stalin's rear, with 210, 280 and 305 mm weapons. At 03:00 the German infantry attacked. The fog of war intervened. The Soviet mortar teams were not suppressed, and a fierce battle developed which lasted until 05:30. The Germans, with the support of five assault guns and a few 37 mm weapons, silenced the fort, bunker by bunker. In the heavy fighting a large number of company commanders were killed.

As the Germans seized this vital fort, the neighbouring Volga fort realised it had fallen and shelled the position. A company-sized counterattack by the Soviets was wiped out by German small arms fire. The Germans declared the position secured at 07:00, though some bunkers held out until 15:00. German casualties amounted to 32 dead, 126 wounded and two missing – half of the force committed. Soviet casualties amounted to 20 captured, the remainder were killed. With only 91 men left near the fort, Petrov did not order a recovery attempt – a grave mistake.

The fall of Fort Stalin meant the Soviet defences in the north were on the verge of collapse. Hansen ordered LIV Corps to divert its attention to Fort Maxim Gorky and the elimination of the Soviet 95th Rifle Division. The 95th Rifle Division had been halting the 132nd Infantry Division's progress since the start of the offensive. The 132nd was reinforced by one Regiment from the idle 46th Infantry Division near Kerch. The German 24th, 50th and Romanian 4th Mountain Divisions were to maintain pressure in the central sector while they pushed towards the Mekensia and Gatani Valley and the Chernaya River opening at Severnaya Bay. For three days, 14–16 June, the battle continued as the Axis advanced towards Sevastopol in the face of Soviet resistance. On 15 June the 132nd was within 900 metres of the Maxim Gorky's outer bastion (Bastion I). The front opposite the 25th Soviet Rifles was still strong, but the northern flank was giving way. The 79th Naval Brigade had only 35 percent of its fighting strength remaining. Blocking the way to Maxim Gorky was just 1,000 men of the 95th Rifle Division and 7th Naval Brigade.

The harbour after the battle (July 1942).

In the south the Soviet 109th and 388th Rifle Divisions were forced back along the coast by the German 72nd and 170th Infantry Divisions while the Romanian Corps' 18th Mountain Division dislodged the Soviet 386th Rifle Division threatening XXX Corps' right flank. The battles continued to grind on until 20 June. In six days, XXX Corps had lost 2,646 men. In exchange the outer defences of the 388th Rifle Division had been broken and the formation effectively destroyed. Still, the German advance on Balaklava had been halted. The Germans had not yet reached its outer defences and the Sapun Ridge to the east of the town was still under Soviet control . By 15 June, some 1,000 Soviet soldiers and 1,500 mortar bombs had been captured indicating the Soviets had plenty of ammunition after two weeks of battle.

Despite shortages of aviation fuel and ordnance, the Luftwaffe had played a significant part in the success of the German operations. From 13 June, up until 17 June, it flew 3,899 sorties and dropped 3,086 tons of bombs. This average of 780 sorties per day was only a slight drop from the opening 11 days. Massed sorties were made on the city of Sevastopol itself. Bombing targeted hangars, port facilities, flak and artillery batteries, barracks, supply depots with high explosive bombs. Most of the city was engulfed in flames. The smoke rose to 1,500 metres and stretched to Feodosiya, 150 kilometres away.

Ground fighting: 16–28 June.

Destroyed Soviet "Maxim Gorky" naval artillery.

As Hansen poised his corps for the breakthrough against the 95th Rifle Division, 27 Ju 87s of II/StG 77 attacked Maxim Gorky's main battery. The Germans believed the strike had knocked it out as it stopped firing its artillery. The Soviets claimed the fort withstood the bombing, and the fort ran out of ammunition. Still, the artillery bombardment began on 16 June. In the morning the attack by the reinforced 132nd Division collapsed the line. The Soviet garrison held out in underground tunnels, capitulating only on 20 June.

The 22nd and 24th Infantry Divisions advanced from the northeast. They employed their Goliath remote control demolition vehicles with success against the timber bunkers. One exploded prematurely and two were knocked out by a minefield. Two Panzer III control vehicles were knocked out by Soviet anti-tank fire. By 19:30, Forts Maxim Gorky, Molotov, Schishkova, Volga and Siberia were overrun. The 24th Infantry Division in particular made extensive use of its Nebelwerfer rockets. The 95th and 172nd Rifle Divisions had been lost, as well as the majority of the fortifies defences. Only the 25th Rifle remained in the line. Petrov rushed up the 138th Naval Brigade with an extra 2,600 men, which was landed on the 12–13 June. It prevented German forces reaching Severnaya Bay that day.

The Luftwaffe was also engaged in applying pressure to Soviet naval forces. On 18 June the cruiser Kharkov was severely damaged. Attacks on 19 June by KG 51 destroyed the anti-aircraft platform in Severnaya Bay, allowing air operations to continue unopposed. The lack of anti-aircraft cover made it impossible for the minelayer Komintern to enter the harbour with reinforcements. The lack of supplies ensured Soviet ammunition and fuel supplies to slip to critical levels on 20 June. The Luftwaffe was experiencing shortages of its own. The daily average of sorties was now reduced by 40 percent. Due to the shortages of bombs, all ordnance had to be dropped individually to minimise wastage. Some experienced crews had to conduct dive-bombing attacks 25–30 times a day. kg 51's Ju 88 crews in particular had felt the strain.

The pressure tolled, and between the 18–23 June, the entire Soviet defence line in the north collapsed. The remnants of the 95th Rifle Division was huddled into a 2 km square portion of coast line near Coastal Battery 12, north of the Bay. At 09:00 the battery and the division surrendered to the 132nd Infantry Division. Further south the 24th Infantry Division captured Bartenyevka, on the mouth of the Bay. The 22nd Infantry Division had reached the north of the Bay on the same day. The Soviet 138th Naval Brigade counterattacked, but it was destroyed without artillery and air support. On 20 June, the 24th Infantry Division tackled the main obstacle remaining on the north side of the Bay. The Lenin anti-aircraft position protected by the Northern Fort, a position which had 5 metres wide anti-tank ditched, 1,000 mines, 32 concrete bunkers, seven armoured cupolas, and 70 earth-and-timber bunkers making it a formidable defensive position. The Lenin defences surrendered, having already lost three of their four 76 mm weapons. The Germans tried to use the remote-controlled mines to break into the North Fort, but they were knocked out. At 11:30 on 21 June the Fort fell after a sustained infantry attack. Around 182 Soviet prisoners were taken. The Germans began mopping up operations and clearing the northern shore. Most Soviet units were exhausted and out of ammunition, surrendering quickly. Others made attempts at a last stand. Some tried to evacuate across to the southern side by boat, but they were picked off by German artillery.

While the main actions were playing out in the north, XXX Corps alternated between attack and defence. The Soviets held the Sapun Ridge and could observe German movements. On occasion they could deliver effective counter battery fire. Between the 21–28 June, the Germans lost 10 artillery pieces, including five 150 mm s.FH 18 medium howitzers. In the centre, the Romanians took up the slack. The 18th Infantry, 1st, and 4th Mountain Divisions, supported by 100 guns, gradually advanced up the Chernaya River towards the mouth of the river and Severnaya Bay. With support from LIV Corps on its left, the Axis captured all the Soviet defensive lines east of the Chernaya River.

The Luftwaffe had contributed 4,700 sorties in seven days up until 26 June. They dropped 3,984 tons of bombs. The daily average sorties had decreased 15 percent from the week before and 10 percent the week before that. The increasing operational readiness (49.8 to 64.5 percent) revealed the severity of bomb and fuel shortages.[56] Von Wild, despite the withdrawal of some Geschwader for Operation Blue, did succeed in bringing in much needed reinforcements to bring the strength levels up to a standard not seen since the start of the offensive. The Luftwaffe continued the intense bombardment. On 26 June, its attacks supporting XXX Corps, devastated Soviet defences on the Sapun Ridge. It was the last Soviet defensive line between the Axis and Sevastopol.

Axis land, sea and air offensive: 29 June.

Fall of Sevastopol: 30 June – 4 July.

As the German 11th Army closed in, Stalin himself made it categorically clear that the top commanders, Party and administrative officials be brought out by submarine. Oktyabrskii and Petrov were flown out at the last moment. On 30 June, LIV Corps launched a heavy assault, supported by heavy Luftwaffe bombardment and several dozen guns. Heavy fighting took place for the next three days, but it was becoming clear that the Soviets could not hold their increasingly untenable positions for more than a day, at most. On 3 July, the Soviets' last line of defense was breached. The following day, the last of the Soviet defenses were overrun, and with the city finally under German control, all organised resistance collapsed. The few remaining Red Army units continued to put up scattered resistance to the south of the city, which lasted until 9 July.

Museum of the heroic defense of Sevastopol.

The Museum of the heroic defense of Sevastopol was opened in 1905.

Panorama “Defense of Sevastopol from 1854-1855:

Panorama “Defense of Sevastopol from 1854-1855” is a world known work of battle-scene painting and it is a monument to the heroism of Sevastopol defenders during the Crimean (Eastern) war of 1853-1856. This war was held between Russia and a coalition of states: Great Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia and it was a result of a political and economic struggle for the sphere of influence in Europe and the Middle East. The war ended in Russia’s defeat. But the 349 days of defense of Sevastopol, the main sea fortress of the Black Sea, caused the admiration of the whole world. The deeds of the Sevastopol heroes are commemorated by numerous monuments. The best monument is the Panorama. It was erected at the 50th anniversary of the defense. Its author is an outstanding painter of battle scenes, founder of Russian panoramic art, Frantz Rubo (1856-1928).

The main avenue of Historical parkway conducts to a world known monument. It is a panorama telling about one of episodes of a 349-day's heroic defense of Sevastopol - reflection by the defence counsels cities of storm June 6, 1855. The author of a panorama - founder of Russian panoramic art France Alekseevich Rubo (1856-1928), professor of a class battle painting of applied arts St.Petersburg Academy, and then valid member of this academy.

Panorama "Defense of Sevastopol 1854-1855 гг." was opened on May 14, 1905, in commemoration 50 years famous epopee. The original round building with a dome, crown with rotunda, is erected under the project of the military engineer O. I. Enberg and architect V. A. Feldman. A diameter of a building - 36 m, height it also 36 m. Classical 2-columns portal, revetted with inkerman's stone, at the top of decorated by elements of the militarian decor: soldier's Georgy cross twine by Georgy's ribbon; at centre - figure "349", designating number of days of a defense.

Inside a building the picturesque cloth (length it 115 m, height 14 m, area 1610 m2) and subject plan by the area 900 ì2 located on a special scaffold is placed. On a plan of the artist, the spectator, by rising on special observation platform, as though appears at top Malakhov mound per day of assault on June 6, 1855. Just on Malakhov mound there were decisive events which have defined outcome of assault as "the first serious defeat of France-English army". During Great Domestic war fascist bombs have destroyed the panorama building, the unique picture has lit up. Risking life, soviet soldiers have taken out a part of a picturesque cloth from a flaring building.

After war the panorama was reconstructed by the soviet painters. The creative group consisting of 17 persons, was headed in the beginning by the academician V. V. Yakovlev, and after his death other known painter - academician P. P. Sokolov-Museum of Sevastopol Heroic DefenceSkalia. By studying events, about which the panorama told, and also rescued fragments of a picturesque cloth, photos, old booklets, the painters anew have written a picture, recreated the subject plan. The intense labour of collective painters was completed to 100 years of the first heroic defense of Sevastopol. In 1970 in a building of a panorama the exposition of a Museum of a heroic defense and liberation of Sevastopol telling about unforgettable events and heroes of a defense, and also about the panorama has opened.

In 1974 in outside niches of a building the marble sculptural portraits of the admirals V. A. Kornilov, P. S. Nakhimov, V. I. Istomin, A. I. Panfilov, F. M. Novosilskiy, captain 1 rank G. I. Butakov, general S. L. Hrulev, staff-captain A. V. Melnikov, glorified sailors Petr Koshka and Ignatiy Shevchenko, favorite of the defence counsels of city Dasha Sevastopolskaya (Mihaylova), "of the wonderful doctor" P. I. Pirogov, great Russian writer L. N. Tolstoy are established.

Diorama “Assault of Sapun Hill on May 7th, 1944”

Diorama “Assault of Sapun Hill on May 7th, 1944” is a composition centre of memorial complex, located on a natural hill, which was the scene of a violent struggle during the Great patriotic War. One of Sevastopol defensive lines was located her during the period of 1941-1942. During the occupation of the city by German fascists (1942-1944) Sapun hill was turned into a “stone front”, and it held a key position in the system of defensive constructions. It included from 3 to 6 staged trenches and 70 permanent weapon emplacements. The enemy’s defense could put up to 100 bullets per minute through each attacking Soviet soldier. And under such conditions Sapun Hill was seized after a 9 hour battle. Only a few minutes of the battle are depicted on the canvass of the diorama of the “Assault of Sapun hill on May 7th, 1944”.The authors of this work are the artists of art studios named after M. Grekov, P. Maltsev, and N. Prisekin. Over 7 months they worked on the canvas of 25.5 х 5.5 metres and a topical plan of 83 square meters. In August of 1959 both parts of the diorama were delivered to Sevastopol and were placed in the building, specially constructed in accordance with the project of the architect V. Petropavlovsky. That building was located on Sapun hill. By May 9th, 1945 a military-field museum had been constructed. More than 24 million people have attended that place since then. According to the artist’s plan a spectator should feel as if he were on Sapun hill in the second half of the day, when the battle reached its climax. The heroes portrayed in the foreground of the picture are real individuals; some of them bear portrait likeness. In the picture a real lay of the land is reproduced with trophy weapons and outfits, collected at the battle field.

The Defensive tower of Malakhov kurgan

Malakhov kurgan is located in the south-eastern part of Sevastopol. Its height is 97 meters above sea level. There are more than 20 monuments and memorials, connected with the first defense of the city (1854 - 1855) during the Crimean war and the second defense (1941 -1942) during the Great Patriotic War. From 1854-1855 the city was besieged by the armies of Great Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia. As many as 8 bastions were constructed and armed in a short time period under the guidance of Vice-admiral V.A. Kornilov. Malakhov kurgan held the leading position among the Russian fortifications. V.A. Kornilov was lethally wounded on the kurgan on October 5th (17), 1854. A monument was erected here in 1895 (it was restored in 1983). V.A. Kornilov’s last words: “Defend Sevastopol” are carved on the monument. And people started to call Malakhov kurgan: theKornilovsky bastion. Malakhov kurgan was a part of the 4th distance of the defense line, under the command of rear admiral V.I. Istomin. According to contemporaries, he was a permanent sentry of Malakhov kurgan, lived in the defense tower; he was contused and two times wounded during the defense. Highly appreciating the fighting spirit of Sevastopol citizens, V.I. Istomin wrote: “I could not help admiring our sailors, soldiers and officers. One can seek such selflessness and heroic firmness in other nations with a candle in his hand”. Rear admiral V.I. Istomin was awarded the St. George order of the Third Class for the defense of Sevastopol. He was killed on March 7th (19), 1855, when returning from Kamchatsky lunette to Malakhov kurgan. The place where he was lethally wounded is indicated with a memorial sign.

The Museum of Sevastopol’s resistance activity

The defense of Sevastopol which lasted 250 days finished at the beginning of July in 1942. The fascists occupied the city and established their “new rules” in it, which brought to its citizens executions, prisoner-of-war camps, mass raids and compulsory labour conscription forced sending to Germany for work. For 22 months the occupiers shot, hanged, drowned more than 27000 people and sent to Germany 45000 Sevastopol citizens and war prisoners. But this did not destroy Sevastopol citizens. 17 separate resistance patriotic groups started their activity in 1942-1943. In the summer – autumn period of 1943 they united into a Communist resistance organization under the guidance of V.D. Revyakin and held its activity at the rear of the enemy.

Vladimir cathedral: burial vault of Russian admirals

The preparation works on the erection of the cathedral started in 1848. The first construction here was the vault where admiral M.P. Lazarev, the chief commander of the Black Sea Fleet was buried. The laying of the foundation stone of the cathedral was held on July 15th, 1854.The Crimean War of 1853-1856 stopped construction works. During the defense of Sevastopol Sevastopol heroes were buried in this vault: admirals Kornilov, Istomin, Nakhimov.In 1862 the construction of the cathedral in a Russian and Byzantine style was renewed. The initial project of architect K.A. Ton was developed by architect A.A. Avdeev (1818-1895). Marble works were conducted by the Italian sculptor V. Bonani, walls and arches were painted by the artist A.E. Karneev; ornaments were made by the Italian artist R. Izello. The cathedral was consecrated in 1888.

Exhibition activity.

The Exhibition activity is one of the reflections of research work, conducted by the Museum. Thus, during the period of 1998-2003, 72 new exhibitions were organized: 21 stationary and 51 mobile. They all present Museum collections, reflecting the history of the city.Every year the museum organizes stationary exhibitions which are displayed on Sapun Hill, in Revyakina square and Istorichesky boulevard. Mobile exhibitions are granted on lease for organizations, military units, educational institutions, and are displayed by the museum in streets and squares of the city during the days of gala events.

Bibliography:

1.Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941%E2%80%9342)

2.Site Russia the great. http://russia.rin.ru/guides_e/10735.html

3.Site Sokolniki Exhibition and Convention Centre / Other Social projects. http://sever.sokolniki.com/eng/polarmuseum/supportteam/221.aspx

4.Ванеев Г. И. Севастополь, 1941-1942. Хроника героической обороны. — Киев: Украина, 1995. — Т. 1. — 234-251 с. — ISBN 5-319-01359-0.

5.Ванеев Г. И. Севастополь, 1941-1942. Хроника героической обороны. — Киев: Украина, 1995. — Т. 2. — 285 с. — ISBN 5-319-01374-4.

6.Э. фон Манштейн «Утерянные победы» — М.: ACT; 1999. — 896 с.

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